COMMENT ⊗   VALID 00002 PAGES
C REC  PAGE   DESCRIPTION
C00001 00001
C00002 00002	"experience" as a vague concept
C00006 ENDMK
C⊗;
"experience" as a vague concept

	This note is based on a conversation with Elliot Eisner at lunch
on Nov 21, 1980.

	The issue arose of whether a computer can experience colors
and not merely detect them.  It seemed that whether a given program
is experiencing the colors depends on the notion
of experience being used, and it forces the resolution of ambiguities
that are ordinarily not even noticed, let alone resolved.

	A traditional philosophical approach would be to identify some
of these ambiguities and try to resolve them.  However, for AI purposes,
as I have commented elsewhere, it is of greater interest to inquire
how the ambiguous concept could survive for a lifetime without
presenting difficulties.

	Here are some of the particular ambiguities that came up in
the discussion:

	#. Eisner proposed that not all input is experienced and was
inclined to determine whether something was experienced by whether
it could be recalled later.  It came up that it was ambiguous whether
this meant recalled on a request to say what happened at a certain time
or could be confirmed by asking leading questions.

	#. There are also %2de re - de dicto%1 questions.  If he saw
me put a pill in my coffee and drink it, and I drop dead twenty minutes
later, did he see me poisoning myself if he didn't connect the two?
What if he makes the connection on later prompting?  If yes, this
makes whether he saw me poison myself rather than merely saw me
put the pill in the coffee and drink it retroactively changable.

	A recent article in %2American Scientist%1 classifying
forms of aphasia emphasizes the fact, also discussed in Dennett's
%2Brainstorms%1 article "Can a computer experience pain", that
different aspects of experience are localized in different places
in the brain.

%3Goodglass, Harold (1980)%1: "Disorders of Naming Following Brain
Injury", %2American Scientist%1, vol. 68, No. 6, November, December.